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The New Business Imperatives in the Environmental Regulation
Area - Impact of Environmental Concerns on Business
Transactions: Who Really Pays?
Clive V Allen*
During this conference we have heard speakers explain in some detail
the environmental laws of Canada and the United States, and we have
heard other speakers outline key environmental issues for the 1990s and
beyond. We have listened to discussions, often in more than one session,
of specific environmental problems, including the clean-up of contami-
nated properties, to name but one.
We now turn to what I consider to be one of the most critical ques-
tions of all. What impact do environmental laws have on business trans-
actions and, specifically, as the conference program asks, "who really
pays" the costs of complying with such laws?
As will shortly become clear, I am of the view that, more and more
often, the party required to pay is the party with the "deep pocket", and
not necessarily the party who is or was at fault. Such a practice can
unfairly penalize profitable businesses having sound and progressive envi-
ronmental programs, as well as businesses seeking funds to undertake
remedial projects and lenders willing to advance such funds. If not
checked, the practice eventually may have a chilling effect on the flow of
capital to businesses located in jurisdictions that have incorporated the
practice into their environmental laws.
Before turning to the topic before us, let me make three comments.
I have been asked to present a Canadian perspective. I propose to do so,
but at the same time I must point out that my comments are not neces-
sarily limited to Canada. Although the corporation with which I am
associated is Canadian in origin, it has substantial operations throughout
the world, and I expect my comments will have the same scope.
Second, the topic for discussion is exceedingly broad, and in the lim-
ited time available to me I cannot do justice to each and every relevant
aspect. I must of necessity refer only to certain issues and, for the pur-
pose of illustrating my points, propose to focus primarily on laws related
to the clean-up of contaminated properties.
Finally, I propose to conclude my remarks with a number of recom-
mendations which, if implemented, may assist in making the application
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of environmental regulation more equitable and ensure that clean-up
costs are borne by actual polluters and not by innocent parties.
THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE
In the early 1970s, members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development endorsed the principle of "polluter pays",
which requires that businesses bear the costs of any environmental dam-
age they may cause. Until recently, the environmental laws of most ju-
risdictions were firmly based on this principle.
It is worth noting that the polluter pays principle has been frequently
criticized.' It is said, among other things, to be elastic and open to inter-
pretation. For instance, does it permit the retroactive imposition of
liability?
While such criticisms may be justified, in my view the principle is
nonetheless significant, because it makes it clear that a party that has
neither caused nor contributed to environmental damage - by actually
carrying on a polluting activity or by improperly allowing it to continue
- should not be liable to clean-up the damage. To do otherwise would
be manifestly unfair and would provide an unfair competitive advantage
to the polluter.
As recently as July 1989, a consultant, in a report to the Province of
Ontario summarizing the regulation of industrial toxic and hazardous
emissions in Ontario and various Canadian, United States and other ju-
risdictions, concluded that all jurisdictions surveyed were operating on
the polluter pays principle.2
While this conclusion might have been at the time correct in the
case of toxic and hazardous emissions, the principle has been replaced, at
least in some jurisdictions with respect to the clean-up of contaminated
properties, by a new principle that the party with the deep pocket should
remain forever liable, even in circumstances where that party has neither
caused nor contributed to environmental damage.
THE DEEP POCKET PRINCIPLE
This new principle can best be illustrated by referring to recent
amendments to the Environmental Protection Act3 of the Province of
Ontario.
In June 1990, the Act was quietly amended to provide the Ministry
of the Environment with the power to issue a control order or a stop
order to the person who previously owned, was in occupation of, or had
I See, e.g., Kyle McSlarrow, International Trade and the Environment: Building a Framework
for Conflict Resolution, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10589, 10593 (1991).
2 HICKLING MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS LTD., THE REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL Toxic
AND HAZARDOUS EMISSIONS IN ONTARIO AS COMPARED WITH SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (1989).
3 R.S.O. ch. E-19 (1990) (Ont.).
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charge, management or control of a "source of contaminant". 4 Prior to
the amendment, only the person owning, occupying, operating, manag-
ing or controlling the source of contaminant could be subject to such
orders.
A second amendment to the Act granted the Ministry the power to
issue a written order against a person who previously owned, managed or
controlled an undertaking or property, requiring the person to take vari-
ous measures to prevent or minimize damage to the environment should
a contaminant be discharged from the undertaking or from the prop-
erty.' Before the amendment, the order could be issued only to the cur-
rent owner or the person in management or control of the undertaking or
property.
Leaving aside the issue of the constitutional validity of the amend-
ments, and the question of how a party that no longer has any association
with a source of contaminant or an undertaking or property can be ex-
pected to comply with Ministry orders, the amendments make certain
parties - the deep pockets - liable for any and all clean-up costs, even
though those parties may not have caused environmental damage or may
have contributed only insignificantly to the problem.
There has been little case law interpreting these and similar provi-
sions so the actual application of the legislation is unknown.6
LENDER AND BORROWER CONCERNS
The deep pocket principle, and the problem of liability for cleaning
up contaminated properties, is obviously of considerable concern to both
lenders and borrowers. In November 1991, the Canadian Bankers Asso-
ciation released a well-reasoned paper on the subject of "Sustainable
Capital: The Effect of Environmental Liability In Canada On Borrow-
ers, Lenders, and Investors". While directed primarily to borrowers and
lenders, the concerns and proposals outlined in the paper are sufficiently
fundamental to be relevant to businesses generally.
The paper begins by listing four typical situations in which lenders
and borrowers can be seriously affected by the deep pocket principle.
These four situations are:
(a) a small business is unable to borrow because it owns property that
is considered to be environmentally risky;
(b) a business is unable to absorb the costs of complying with a gov-
ernment order to clean-up its property without putting itself into a
position of insolvency;
(c) a lender declines to provide financial assistance to a troubled bor-
4 Id. at §§ 7(1), 8(1).
5 Id. at § 18(l).
6 The most recent reported decision, CN Railway Co. v. Ontario (EPA Director), 3 O.R.3d 609
(Div. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 7 O.R.3d 97 (C.A. 1992), did not consider the June 1990 amendments to the
Environmental Protection Act.
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rower in a loan work-out situation for fear of attracting environ-
mental liability to itself;
(d) employees interested in investing in a faltering industrial plant in
order to save their jobs are informed that their investment would
be worthless because of the environmental liability they would be
assuming if they bought the plant.7
The paper then reviews three aspects of the problem of environmen-
tal liability. These aspects - the broad scope of liability, the uncertain
responsibility for clean-up, and the severity of the impact on an innocent
party or one who has contributed only insignificantly to a problem -
have been dealt with in my previous comments explaining the polluter
pays and deep pocket principles.
After discussing the principle of sustainable development and the
need for a principle of sustainable capital, and reviewing United States
superfund legislation and its provisions granting lenders some protection
from environmental liability, the paper offers the following conclusion:
The problem of environmental liability in Canada ultimately reduces
to a simple question - who should pay for environmental cleanup? The
CBA is of the view that the polluter should pay. In the event the pol-
luter cannot pay, then the liability should be treated as a social cost.
The fundamental problem with environmental liability policy in Can-
ada is that the broad and uncertain scope of potential liability departs
from the polluter pay principle. In so doing, it weakens polluter ac-
countability. To address the problem, the CBA proposes an approach
to environmental liability that places responsibility and liability clearly
on actual polluters.
These polluters should not, however, be impaired in their ability to
access capital markets to finance the cost of the cleanup. Parties asso-
ciated with these polluters (e.g. lenders, subsequent purchasers of the
polluter's contaminated property and trustees) should not be tainted
with the polluter's liability where the party has made a reasonable ef-
fort to determine that the polluter is in compliance with environmental
laws.8
I tend to agree with this conclusion and consider it to be relevant to
jurisdictions other than Canada.
THE NORTHERN TELECOM EXPERIENCE
I wish now to provide four examples of Northern Telecom's involve-
ment in the clean-up of contaminated properties in various jurisdictions
in order to illustrate some of the points I have previously made and to
show generally how laws related to the clean-up of contaminated proper-
ties are being implemented by regulatory authorities.
7 CANADIAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, SUSTAINABLE CAPITAL: THE EFFECT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL LIABILITY IN CANADA ON BORROWERS, LENDERS, AND INVESTORS 1 (1991).
8 Id. at 9.
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The first example illustrates, I believe, quite clearly the costs in-
volved in cleaning up site contamination and the difficulty businesses en-
counter in attempting to determine the extent of their clean-up
obligations or, in other words, "how clean is clean".
Several years ago, Northern Telecom agreed to purchase a facility
and property from a large corporation. During the course of our due
diligence investigations, we discovered that groundwater on site had been
contaminated by the vendor. In order to close the transaction, the ven-
dor agreed to clean up the contamination, regardless of the cost or the
time required to do so.
The problem was discovered almost three years ago, but a ground-
water treatment facility constructed by the prior owner is just now being
commissioned. By the time it is operating, the system will have cost the
prior owner well in excess of $1,000,000, and perhaps as much as
$2,000,000. The system will be expensive to operate and will probably
still be operating well into the twenty-first century, long after I have re-
tired from Northern Telecom.
Although we were not directly involved in discussions with the reg-
ulatory authority, it appeared to us, and to our external environmental
consultant, that the regulator recognized that the prior owner was will-
ing to live up to its responsibility to clean-up the site, and also had a deep
pocket. The regulator thus insisted that any groundwater treatment sys-
tem meet very strict operating standards.
As a result, the system being commissioned on our property is a
"Cadillac", whereas given the nature of the problem, a "Volkswagen"
might have been just as acceptable from technical and environmental
perspectives. The regulator, however, will be able to point to the system
as an example of the type to be constructed by others when treating in-
stances of contaminated groundwater, even though simpler, less costly
systems may be just as effective in many circumstances.
During its discussions with the prior owner, the regulator has been
seemingly reluctant or unable to discuss one crucial issue: the standards
for deeming the site clean. The prior owner is in an unenviable position.
It is impossible for it to know "how clean is clean", how long it will be on
site, and what amount of money it will ultimately be required to spend on
remedial activities. These uncertainties should not be imposed on any
business.
If the deep pocket principle were to apply to this example, Northern
Telecom, as the new owner of the property, would be potentially liable
for cleaning-up the contaminated groundwater, even though it is com-
pletely innocent of any wrongdoing.
Furthermore, if the transaction was to take place in 1992, and in a
jurisdiction embracing the deep pocket principle, we would consider very
carefully whether the acquisition was absolutely essential to our business
5
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plans. Even if it were, if the vendor was small or in financial difficulty,
environmental issues might dictate that we not proceed further.
Example 11
The second example is the converse of the first. A few years ago,
Northern Telecom sold a facility and, as part of the transaction, the pur-
chaser, a small, newly-formed corporation, assumed certain environmen-
tal liabilities. The purchase price, negotiated by experienced
businessmen on both sides, took into account that Northern Telecom
would have no further liability for such matters and that the purchaser
would continue with certain relatively minor remedial activities.
If the deep pocket principle were to apply, Northern Telecom would
have a potential liability for cleaning-up any contamination it may have
caused, as well as any and all contamination that may be caused in the
future by the purchaser or subsequent purchasers. Should a problem
arise requiring remedy, I can assure you that I know exactly who the
regulator would approach.
Example III
The third example is intended to show the type of delay businesses,
particularly those believed by regulators to have deep pockets, frequently
encounter when seeking approval to carry out remedial projects.
Soil and groundwater contamination was discovered in the mid
1980s at one of our facilities. Remedial action was clearly required, espe-
cially as the plume of contaminated groundwater extended off-site to-
wards a residential neighborhood.
Our outside consultant prepared a suitable remedial plan which was
submitted in a timely fashion to the regulator for approval. No clean-up
work could be undertaken until such approval was received.
Regrettably, we had to wait, for no apparent reason as far as we
could see, well over a year for the approval. In that time, the contamina-
tion moved further off-site with a resultant increase in the costs and time
required for clean-up. This was not a serious problem for a company our
size, but was the environment protected as quickly as it might otherwise
have been? I suggest not.
Example IV
I turn now to the last example. This example does not deal directly
with the clean-up of contaminated properties, but illustrates the manner
in which one regulatory authority dealt with businesses it perceived as
having deep pockets.
Several years ago, Northern Telecom retained a company to trans-
port hazardous waste to a disposal facility. Northern Telecom had an
agreement in place with the company requiring it to properly handle all
waste. During routine investigations, Northern Telecom had not discov-
Vol. 18:351 1992
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ered anything wrong with the operations of the company, which had
been licensed by all applicable regulatory authorities.
Following a tip from a disgruntled employee, the regulator deter-
mined that the company was stockpiling waste in warehouses and not
shipping it to disposal facilities on a timely basis. There were rumors at
the time that the regulator had not adequately investigated similar earlier
tips.
Notwithstanding the potential criticism that could be levelled at the
regulator, or perhaps because of it, the companies whose wastes were
stored in warehouses - the deep pockets - were asked rather bluntly to
reclaim and dispose of the wastes. Although not under a legal obligation
to do so, Northern Telecom, like most if not all of the other companies,
paid a second time to have their wastes properly handled. I wonder how
much more difficult this regulator would have been to deal with if the law
had in fact been on its side.
CONCLUSIONS
I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks that I would provide a
number of recommendations for making the application of environmen-
tal regulation more equitable and for ensuring that clean-up costs are
borne by actual polluters, not by innocent parties. I have three
recommendations:
1. Liability for cleaning up environmental damage must be imposed
only on the actual polluter and not on an innocent party. If the
polluter cannot pay, or cannot be found, and the current owner
of the business or property is innocent of any wrongdoing, liabil-
ity for clean-up must be the responsibility of society as a whole.
2. As a corollary to my first recommendation, a party should not be
considered a polluter and subject to environmental regulation
merely because environmental standards have changed. If a
party has in the past fully complied with all applicable environ-
mental laws, and has no further connection with the business or
property, it should not retroactively become subject to clean-up
obligations.
3. A party's obligation to clean-up environmental damage must be
in proportion to the damage that party has caused.
In closing, I would like to offer one personal observation. If the
recommendations are not implemented, and should the deep pocket prin-
ciple be allowed to become the norm, profitable, environmentally-sound
businesses will be unfairly disadvantaged as polluters are given an unfair
competitive advantage, and financial institutions and investors will be-
come hesitant to lend to borrowers having even seemingly insignificant
environmental problems. Should this happen, economic growth may
very well be stymied.
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